This paper investigates a model where two corporate venture capital firms (CVCs) decide whether to finance a new venture stand-alone or together, called syndication. 
Introduction
Corporate venture capital plays an important role in financing young firms with uncertain but high growth expectations. I define corporate venture capital as minority equity investments by an incumbent company in entrepreneurial firms, similar to Dushnitsky (2012) . After passing cyclical investment waves in the last decades, National Venture Capital Association (2016) states that nearly 22% of all venture capital deals are realized by incumbent companies nowadays.
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The incumbents frequently use specialized subsidiaries that allocate their corporate venture capital towards young firms. A typical feature of these corporate venture capital firms (CVCs) is that they pursue two different goals: beside high financial returns (e.g. initial public offering or the sale of ownership stakes), there are often more diverse and complex innovation objectives (e.g. an access to new products, a window on new technologies or generating demand).
2 Hence, corporate venture capital can be seen as an access to otherwise untapped innovations that are critical to the incumbents success and longevity.
By contrast, independent venture capital firms (IVCs) are only driven by financial returns due to the absence of a parental company. As it is well known, both investor types often share the financing cost and the nonmonetary support with other investors. This so-called syndication means in a restrictive sense that a cooperation of two or more investors takes place in a particular financing round. If the term is used more broadly, it also describes situations where investors enter different financing rounds. The former definition can be seen as basis for this paper.
Empirical observations suggest a lack of research about the determinants of syndicates consisting of several CVCs. Park and Steensma (2012) and Souitaris and Zerbinati (2014) Second, if an investor is confronted with a substitute and the other investor faces a complement, syndicates between both investors are still possible. Third, the change in the asset's value occurs as a positive external effect for one CVC, if the other CVC is the stand-alone investor. However, the allocation of the shares in a syndicate can balance the change in the assets' values among the CVCs. As a consequence, the shareholding provides an opportunity to internalize this externality, such that both CVCs accept to syndicate. The syndicate enables a higher utility for both CVCs than in the former stand-alone investment situation.
An investment situation involving only CVCs may occur because, in contrast to other investor types like independent venture capital firms (IVCs), corporate investors have the ability to support the young firms better by using certain resources.
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Park and Steensma (2012), for instance, stress that the mobile broadband service provider Airvana succeeds because of the CVC's cost-intensive testing infrastructure owned by the parental company. Emphasizing the importance of the support, Chemmanur and Loutskina (2008) also remark that CVCs provide specialized industry expertise to enable a successful development of their ventures. For instance, young FinTech firms are confronted with comprehensive regulatory conditions (e.g.
bank licenses or deposit guarantee), so that an adequate support by an incumbent company or its CVC is desirable.
This paper is closely related to Hellmann (2002) . An important difference is that I focus on the investment decision of two CVCs, whereas Hellmann (2002) Compared to stand-alone investments, Tian (2011) shows that syndicates create a product market value and a financial market value for the ventures. Moreover, Casamatta and Haritchabalet (2007) and Cestone et al. (2006) formally show that an additionally screening advise on a potential venture is the reason for a syndicate.
In this way, they follow the selection hypothesis of Lerner (1994) .
The syndication decision of IVCs that are confronted with a CVC as syndication partner is only partially analyzed. Hill et al. (2009) state that syndicates between corporate investors and IVCs lead to a higher investment output per year and a 5 See, for instance Block and MacMillan (1993) , Maula (2001) , Dushnitsky (2008) and Ivanov and Xie (2010) . 6 Sharifzadeh and Walz (2012) remark six reasons for syndication: risk-sharing (Brander et al., 2002) , selection (Sah and Stiglitz, 1986; Lerner, 1994) , value added (Brander et al., 2002) , steady deal flow (Hochberg et al., 2007) , window dressing (Lerner, 1994) and staged financing problems (Fluck et al., 2005) .
lower closure rate among ventures. In this regard, Hellmann (2002) of the entrepreneur's product. As a result, the analysis shows that if the young firm is a complement to the large company, the CVC is chosen by the entrepreneur. On the other hand, the IVC is the optimal choice if the young firm is a weak substitute.
Syndication is optimal, such that the CVC cooperates with the IVC, only if the young firm is a strong substitute.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in the next section I introduce the theoretical model. Section 3 presents the analysis of the investment decision of both CVCs. In Section 4, I derive empirical predictions from the theoretical results and review existing empirical evidence. The last section concludes. All proofs are included in the appendix.
The Model
I consider two risk-neutral CVCs, CV C i with i ∈ {1, 2}, and a wealthless venture which needs a capitalization normalized to 1. There are two possible future states of nature that I call success and failure. If CV C i decides to finance the new venture and it succeeds, then CV C i obtains the cash flow R > 1. If the venture fails, there are no cash flows. Success occurs with probability q ∈ (0, 1). If CV C i does not finance the venture, then it obtains a risk-free cash flow r, where 1 ≤ r < R.
In order to highlight the innovation objectives of CVCs, I suppose that a particular asset of the parental company is affected by the success of the venture, following Hellmann (2002) . The asset can be thought of as a particular product or process.
Specifically, the exogenous variable θ i represents the change in the asset's value that is caused by the venture's success. The variable θ i is well-known to all players and does not include any monetary cash flow. If θ i ≥ 0, then the venture is a complement for the parental company's. If θ i < 0, then the venture substitutes the parental company's asset. Note that θ i may differ among the parental companies.
Therefore, a particular venture can be a complement for a parental company, while it is also a substitute for the other. Hellmann (2002) and Riyanto and Schwienbacher (2006) . 8 Masulis and Nahata (2009) and Ivanov and Xie (2010) have shown that one reason for sabotage is the obstruction of the survival of a venture that may turn out to be a possible competitor to the parental company. In this model, the nonmonetary support does not have an impact on the success probability q.
It can be seen as a value added or an increase of the value of the venture, namely
An investor determines simultaneously with its investment decision the particular support value. The support activities are by and large complex (e.g.
mentoring, endorsement to clients) so that they cannot be stated in a contract upon, in contrast to Riyanto and Schwienbacher (2006) and Casamatta and Haritchabalet (2007) .
If a contract is offered, then the venture contracts with at least one of the CVCs, which is a simplifying assumption. 9 However, this assumption is not critical since several empirical studies found evidence that entrepreneurial firms have a high incentive to obtain external funds and nonmonetary support by a CVC. 10 Only one financing round takes place and all parties have symmetric information.
I characterize subgame-perfect equilibria as the solution concept for the following two investment settings.
Stand-Alone Case
The stand-alone setting is represented by a sequential game with two stages. CV C 1 decides first between investment and no investment. If CV C 1 chooses the latter, then CV C 2 has the opportunity to offer a contract at the next stage. 11 A stand-alone investment may emerge in markets in which each CVC wants to prevent influence of other corporate investors on the venture. Suppose CV C i finances the venture. The 8 For simplification, I write that the variable s i represents a nonmonetary support although it could be negative. 9 In contrast to Hellmann (2002) , I suppose that the investors have all the bargaining power. 10 See for example Gompers and Lerner (2000) , Maula (2001) , Hochberg et al. (2007) and Ivanov and Xie (2010) . 11 The results of the model also hold for a situation in which both investors decide simultaneously on an investment. The only difference is that multiple equilibria occur, which does not enrich the main insights of the model.
expected utility is then given by
The superscript j = 1, 2 refer to the particular investor and the subscript i = 1, 2 refers to the utility of the considered CVC. If CV C j finances the venture, then CV C i obtains the externality θ i , without incurring any costs and the risk-free cash flow r.
CV C i 's expected utility is then given by
Note that the change in the asset's value is reinforced by the nonmonetary support of the opponent. For this investment pattern, the innovation component may be described as a positive externality for complements and as a negative externality for substitutes. If both CVCs reject the venture, then each CV C only obtains the risk-free cash flow U no i = r − 1.
Syndication Case
In the syndication case, I consider a syndicate, in which both CVCs invest jointly.
The CVCs decide simultaneously on the support level s i , with i ∈ {1, 2}. Given this, I show that there is a unique equilibrium in the support levels.
In a second step, I check if this syndicate satisfies the criterion of stability. The syndicate is stable if and only if it represents a Pareto improvement compared to the equilibrium of the stand-alone setting. Hence, the syndicate is acceptable for CV C i if the utility from syndicate is equal or higher than in the stand-alone case. Otherwise, CV C i blocks the syndicate and the stand-alone setting occurs. The expected utility of syndicate member CV C i is given by
In a syndicate, CV C i obtains half of the expected cash flow and finances half of the initial outlay. 12 The rest of the potential fund is invested in the alternative and will yield the expected return 1 2 r. Thus, the primary cost of a syndicate is that both
CVCs have to share the generated cash flow of their investment. 13 The change in 12 The results are qualitatively unchanged if one CVC has larger shares or in other words if one CVC is the lead investor. 13 Yung (2012) remarks that the cost of syndication do not only contain the shareholding. Moreover, to put another IVC on inquiry to a investment object may arise a potential competitor. See, the asset value θ i is a private value for CV C i and cannot be split. Furthermore, if a syndicate finances the venture, it obtains the support s i of CV C i and additional the support s j of CV C j . This assumption is consistent with the value-added hypothesis suggested by Brander et al. (2002) .
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Equilibrium Analysis
Without loss of generality, let θ 1 ≥ θ 2 . Additionally, I suppose that the venture is a complement for both CVCs (θ i ∈ R + ). I will relax this assumption later and suppose that the venture is a complement for CV C 1 (θ 1 ≥ 0) but a substitute for CV C 2 (θ 2 < 0).
Stand-Alone Case
In the stand-alone case, CV C 1 decides first whether to invest or not. 
The solution to this problem is given by:
Note that the weaker (stronger) the complement the lower (higher) is the nonmonetary support of CV C 2 . Likewise, the lower (higher) the expected cash flow the lower (higher) is the nonmonetary support of CV C 2 .
Given that CV C 1 has not invested, CV C 2 thus obtains U 2 2 ( s 2 ) if it finances the venture and U no 2 otherwise. Comparing these utility levels, the following condition for instance Casamatta and Haritchabalet (2007) and Cestone et al. (2006) . 14 By contrast, Hellmann (2002) and Casamatta and Haritchabalet (2007) suppose that only the lead investor of a syndicate provides nonmonetary support.
has to be fulfilled for an investment:
Substituting the optimal support s 2 into expression (5), yields
It is easy to show that still not invest at the first stage and the alternative r increases, then only stronger complements obtain funds by CV C 2 due to an increase in the value of the outside option U no 2 . On the other hand, if the success probability increases, then weaker complements may be financed by CV C 2 . The same applies for an increase in the expected cash flow. Intuitively, there exists a threshold, for which CV C 2 decides to finance all complementary ventures, whenever the expected cash flow is above this threshold:
Working backwards, I investigate the optimal action of CV C 1 . Suppose it decides to invest. Similar to its opponent, CV C 1 provides nonmonetary support in order to increase the value of the venture. The optimal support is analogously given by
Suppose now condition (6) is not fulfilled. Then CV C 2 chooses not to invest in the continuation game in which CV C 1 does not invest. Thus, CV C 1 compares the utility levels U 1 1 ( s 1 ) and U no 1 . The resulting threshold is analogous to condition (6):
Second, I assume that condition (6) is fulfilled. Then CV C 2 chooses to invest in the continuation game in which CV C 1 does not invest. Given this, CV C 1 obtains
Substituting the optimal supports s 1 and s 2 into expression (9), yields
I summarize the above analysis in the following proposition, that states the equilibrium behavior of both CVCs in the stand-alone setting:
Proposition 1 (Stand-alone investment). The stand-alone case has a unique equilibrium, that can be characterized as follows.
(i) No investment occurs if condition (6) and (8) do not hold.
(ii) Suppose condition (6) holds and (7) does not hold. Then CV C 2 becomes the investor if condition (10) does not hold. Otherwise, CV C 1 is the investor.
(iii) Suppose condition (7) holds. Then CV C 2 becomes the investor if condition (10) does not hold. Otherwise, CV C 1 is the investor.
The equilibrium classes of the stand-alone setting are illustrated in Figure Recall that the venture is a complement for both CVCs and θ 1 ≥ θ 2 .
Consider Figure 1 part (b), where condition (7) holds. CV C 2 finances the venture only if the venture is a strong complement for both investors (i.e. condition (10) is satisfied). In other words, if the expected cash flow is higher, CV C 1 is better of investing alone for more couples of {θ 1 ; θ 2 } and not to obtain θ 1 plus the alternative r through an investment of the opponent. 15 The reasoning underlying this result is straightforward: the surplus of an investment is the combination of the expected cash flow and the change in the asset's value, that obtains a premium (value added)
15 I state for ϕ(θ 1 ) the following impact of the other model parameters:
R . Thus, the success probability has a varied impact on ϕ(θ 1 ). The intuition is the following: if q > 2r R applies, then
. Therefore, CV C 1 prefers not to invest for more complements.
I, ¡ I Figure 1 : In Illustration (a), condition (7) does not hold, whereas in (b) condition (7) holds.
through the cost-intensive support of the investor, less the capitalization. If the expected cash flow increases, then the value added increases stronger than the costs of the optimal support. As a consequence, the venture becomes valuable for CV C 1 for a wider range of the couple {θ 1 ; θ 2 }.
However, the rejection of an investment is without costs. Hence, θ 1 may also be viewed as a positive external effect for CV C 1 . In addition, the opponent provides the costly support and increases the value of θ 1 . This nonmonetary support increases if the expected cash flow and/or the change in the asset's value increase. Therefore, CV C 1 does not invest if the venture is a strong complement for both investors, i.e.
condition (10) is not satisfied, even for a higher expected cash flow.
It seems worth noting that if CV C 1 invests, then it always provides the same or a higher nonmonetary support than CV C 2 . To see this point, recall that θ 1 ≥ θ 2 .
Hence, the positive externality may prohibit funding of the investor enabling higher nonmonetary support for the venture. The following corollary of Proposition (1) emphasizes this point.
Corollary 1 If CV C 2 is the stand-alone investor, then the nonmonetary support is worse-off compared to the support of a stand-alone investor CV C 1 .
Syndication Case
In this section, I consider a syndicate in which each CV C i obtains U Proposition 2 (Syndicate Support).There exists a unique equilibrium in nonmonetary support levels. The equilibrium is given by
The support s syn i
only depends on the change in the asset's value of CV C i . The change in the asset's value of CV C j is not relevant because it is a private value.
The weaker (stronger) the own complement the lower (higher) is s syn i . Likewise, the lower (higher) the expected cash flow the lower (higher) is the nonmonetary support of each investor.
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I follow Sørensen (2007) by using a stability criterion for the syndicate case. The syndicate is called stable if and only if it represents a Pareto improvement compared to the equilibrium utility of the stand-alone setting. First, suppose the equilibrium of the stand-alone setting is characterized by no investment. Hence, CV C i obtains the stand-alone utility U no i . Then CV C 1 accepts a syndicate if the following condition is fulfilled:
The same approach applies for CV C 2 . This investor accepts a syndicate if the following condition is fulfilled:
Second, I turn to the case when CV C 1 is the stand-alone investor. Hence, CV C 1 obtains U 1 1 ( s 1 ), whereas CV C 2 obtains U 1 2 ( s 1 ). There exists no strictly profitable 16 In contrast to Hellmann (2002) , the venture has to accept the privately optimal support of the investors, even though it is inefficient and not the first-best solution.
deviation from syndication if the following conditions are fulfilled:
for CV C 1 and CV C 2 , respectively.
Last, suppose the equilibrium of the stand-alone setting is characterized by a stand-alone investment of CV C 2 . Thus, CV C 1 obtains U 2 1 ( s 2 ), whereas CV C 2 obtains U 2 2 ( s 2 ). There exist no strictly profitable deviation from syndication if the following condition are fulfilled:
Given the above results, the following lemma establishes useful values of the expected cash flow:
Lemma 1 There exist unique values R, R, R ∈ R + with R < R < R such that
Lemma 1 has an immediate consequence for the next result, which shows that the stability of the syndicate depends on the particular expected cash flow value:
Proposition 3 (Syndication for complements).
(i) Suppose the equilibrium of the stand-alone setting is characterized by no investment. Then a syndicate is stable if R < R and condition (12) holds or if
(ii) Suppose the equilibrium of the stand-alone setting is characterized by an investment of CV C 1 . Then a syndicate is stable if R < R and condition (14) holds, if R ≤ R ≤ R or if R > R and condition (13) holds.
(iii) Suppose the equilibrium of the stand-alone setting is characterized by an investment of CV C 2 . Then a syndicate is stable if R < R and condition (15)
Otherwise the syndicate is not stable.
Suppose the equilibrium of the stand-alone setting is characterized by a standalone investment of CV C 2 and the venture leads to a low expected cash flow (i.e.
R < R). Hence, I consider the upper right region of Figure 1 [See, the field with the notation (¡ ¡ I, I)]. Condition (15) is the only relevant threshold for the comparison of the syndicate utility with the stand-alone utility. That is, CV C 2 always accept a syndicate, whereas CV C 1 considers the threshold υ * * 1 (θ 1 ) (i.e. condition (15)). Given this, the latter investor blocks a syndicate for medium complements, i.e.
. This result can be explained as follows: CV C 1 obtains a value added through the syndicate support, determined by the strength of CV C 2 's complement, i.e. a medium value added. On the other hand, CV C 1 has to bear its share of the investment cost. Intuitively, if the costless impact on the asset plus the alternative r exceeds the surplus of a syndicate, then CV C 1 blocks the syndicate. Figure 2 illustrates this deviation from syndication.
Figure 2: Stability of the syndicate.
In anticipation of the later analysis of higher expected cash flows, I remark that CV C 2 may be the stand-alone investor only if the expected cash flow is low (i.e.
R < R).
If the expected cash flow is medium (i.e. R ≤ R < R), then a syndicate is stable for all complements. The surplus of a syndicate is high enough and exceeds the utility from the stand-alone case.
Suppose now that the venture enables a high expected cash flow (i.e. R ≥ R).
CV C 1 blocks a syndicate, if CV C 2 obtains a weak complement, i.e. θ 2 ∈ [0, υ * * *
) due
17 See, the proof of Proposition (3) for a detailed illustration.
to condition (13). The possible nonmonetary support of CV C 2 is too low to exceed the cost of a syndicate (sharing of the expected cash flow) so that CV C 1 passes the value added of the opponent. However, for θ 2 high enough, i.e. θ 2 > υ * * * 1 (θ 1 ), a syndicate is stable.
Impact of a Substitute
In the current section I relax the assumption that the venture is a complement for both investors and suppose that CV C 2 is confronted with a substitute (θ 2 < 0).
Furthermore, the venture is a complement for CV C 1 . As a preliminary step, I check this modification for the stand-alone case.
Stand-Alone Case
CV C 2 chooses to invest in the continuation game if and only if condition (6) is fulfilled. However, the venture is now a substitute. Hence, the expected cash flow has to be high enough to countervail the negative impact of the substitute on CV C 2 's utility (e.g. condition (7) is satisfied). CV C 1 decides first and compares U 1 1 ( s 1 ) and U 2 1 ( s 2 ). Thus, I check condition (10):
Obviously, if condition (7) is fulfilled, then condition (8) and (10) also hold ∀θ 2 < 0.
As a consequence, CV C 1 decides to finance the venture if CV C 2 chooses to invest in the continuation game. Second, I suppose that condition (6) is not fulfilled.
Then, analogous to Section 2.1, CV C 1 chooses to invest if condition (8) is fulfilled.
Otherwise no investment occurs.
I summarize the above analysis in the following proposition, that states the equilibrium behavior of both CVCs in the stand-alone setting if CV C 2 is confronted with a substitute:
Proposition 4 (Stand-alone investment for a substitute). No investment occurs if condition (8) does not hold. Otherwise, CV C 1 is the investor.
The reasoning underlying this result is straightforward. The nonmonetary support of CV C 2 is reduced by the value q · θ 2 in case of an investment in the continuation game. Hence, a stand-alone investment is chosen by CV C 1 as a best response to an investment of CV C 2 and its reduced support.
Syndication Case
I proceed with the syndication case. The unique equilibrium in support levels is given by s
R + θ i ). Given these support levels there exist a sabotage threshold for CV C 2 due to the negative impact of the substitute. This threshold is given by
Hence, CV C 2 has now an incentive to hinder the development of the venture if The following proposition entails conditions under which the syndicate setting is stable if θ 1 ≥ 0 and θ 2 < 0:
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Proposition 5 (Syndication for a substitute).
(i) Suppose the equilibrium of the stand-alone setting is characterized by no investment. Then a syndicate is stable if R ≥ R and condition (12) holds.
(ii) Suppose the equilibrium of the stand-alone setting is characterized by a standalone investment of CV C 1 . Then a syndicate is stable if R < R and conditions (13) and (14) hold or if R ≤ R < R and condition (13) holds.
I now compare the situation where the venture is a complement for both investors with a situation where the venture is complement for CV C 1 and a substitute for CV C 2 . Intuitively, a syndicate is less often stable if the possible syndication partner of CV C 1 is confronted with a substitute due to a lower nonmonetary support. The next proposition emphasizes this point:
19
18 See, the proof of Proposition (7) for a detailed illustration. 19 Intuitively, if θ i = 0, then the present model is modified to an IVC model. Given this, CVC syndicates lead to a higher value added than IVC syndicates if θ i > 0 and θ j ≥ 0 or θ i > |−θ j |.
Otherwise IVC syndicates lead to a higher value added.
Proposition 6 (Corporate venture capital value-added hypothesis). If the venture is a complement for both CVCs, then a syndicate leads to a higher value added than a stand-alone investment. Otherwise a stand-alone investor enables a higher value added.
Brander et al. (2002) , such that CV C 1 provides nonmonetary support, whereas CV C 2 sabotages the development of the venture.
To understand this point, recall that the syndicate partner bears a share of the capitalization. This cost saving exceeds the value added of a higher nonmonetary support due to a possible stand-alone investment. As a consequence, CV C 1 accepts a syndicate and allows CV C 2 to reduce the negative effect of the venture for itself.
The same effect explains why a syndicate is stable for stronger substitutes, if the expected cash flow decreases down to a lower level.
Shareholding Decision
Consider a modification of the basic model in which the syndicate shares may differ between the CVCs. The shareholding is denoted by α for CV C 1 and (1 − α) for CV C 2 , respectively. I suppose again that the venture is a complement for both CVCs (i.e. θ i ∈ R + ). Henceforth, the expected utility of a syndicate is written:
for CV C 1 and CV C 2 , respectively. Intuitively, the privately optimal support of CV C 1 is now given by s As a preliminary step, I consider the participation constraint. Suppose that the equilibrium of the stand-alone setting is characterized by no investment. Hence, CV C 1 obtains the stand-alone utility U no 1 . CV C 1 has no strictly profitable deviation from syndication if the following condition is fulfilled:
Condition ( 
Thus, CV C 1 is sufficiently motivated to join a syndicate and to exert support if it receives a share above the minimum threshold max {0, α no 1 }. Indeed, the share can be limited to a maximum threshold min {1, α no 1 } because of the investment costs in a syndicate. Hence, for particular investment situations, CV C 1 is better-off to obtain less shares. For CV C 2 , I derive analogously, that the participation constraint
CV C 2 's minimum threshold is defined by max {0, α no 2 } and the maximum threshold is given by min {1, α for investor CV C 2 ). It is important to point out that a syndicate is also possible if the expected cash flow decreases strongly. Stand-alone investor CV C 1 , for instance, may syndicate with CV C 2 if R < R 1 2 . However, the latter investor blocks a high shareholding for itself (i.e. α < α 1 2 ) due to the low expected cash flow.
Pareto Efficient Shareholding Allocation
I now check which shareholding agreements represents the pareto efficient allocation, in the sense that it is impossible to reallocate the shareholding so as to make one CVC better-off without making the other CVC worse-off. As a preliminary step, I state the following derivations:
for CV C 1 and CV C 2 , respectively. Given this, I consider CV C 1 and show the following conditions ∀α ∈ [0; 1]:
Hence, if condition (19) is fulfilled, then CV C 1 is better-off to obtain more shares of the syndicate due to the high expected cash-flow. On the other hand, if condition 
The intuition of these conditions are the same as for CV C 1 . Note that condition and (21):
Given this, there exist two different cases for the order of the above thresholds. I proceed with Proposition (9) and summarize the results:
Proposition 9 (Pareto efficient shareholding allocation). I consider a stable syndicate.
(i) Suppose condition (23) is fulfilled. Otherwise every shareholding α ∈ [0; 1] is pareto efficient.
To understand the intuition of Proposition (9), suppose condition (19) holds, then the CVCs may obtain a high expected cash flow in a stable syndicate. Hence, every shareholding α ∈ [0; 1] is pareto efficient because both investors prefer to obtain more shares. Or in other words, it is impossible to reallocate the shareholding so as to make one CVC better-off without making the other CVC worse-off. On the other hand, if condition (21) holds, then the CVCs may obtain a low expected cash flow.
The CVCs prefer to obtain less shares due to the investment costs. Thus, every shareholding α ∈ [0; 1] is pareto efficient.
I turn next to the case, where the change in the asset's value of CV C 1 is small (e.g. condition (23) holds). If the expected cash flow becomes lower (e.g. condition (19) and (20) do not hold) and α ∈ [α pe 1 ; 1], then the shareholding of CV C 1 can be reallocated so as to make CV C 1 better-off. More precisely, CV C 1 is better-off not to obtain a very high shareholding. On the other hand, CV C 2 is better off to obtain more shares because condition (22) holds. Hence, the reallocation of the shareholding also makes CV C 2 better-off. Given this, the range of pareto efficient shares is limited to the Ã R nterval α ∈ [0; α pe 1 ].
Joint Utility Maximization
I now check which shareholding allocation maximizes the joint utility of a stable syndicate. It takes into account the participation and feasibility constraint of the CVCs.
20 First, I consider the joint utility of a syndicate, that should be divided between the CVCs:
Given this, I show the shareholding allocation among the investors that maximize the joint utility:
where
It is important to point out that the shareholding α ) in a syndicate with several CVCs may maximize the joint utility, given that the innovation advantage differs among the investors.
Note that the share α max has an upper bound with α = 1 2 that occurs if θ 1 = θ 2 or if the expected cash flow is very high. For other parameters combinations, CV C 2 's becomes the lead investor because I suppose that θ 1 ≥ θ 2 . However, there exists a threshold, such that α max ≥ 0:
The following proposition entails conditions under which the shareholding α max can be achieved given that the syndicate setting satisfies the criterion of stability:
Proposition 10 (Second-best shareholding allocation). Suppose condition (25) holds.
The shareholding α max can be established for a stable syndicate (i) if the equilibrium of the stand-alone setting is characterized by no investment and R > R no 2 .
(ii) if the equilibrium of the stand-alone setting is characterized by an investment of CV C 1 and R
(iii) if the equilibrium of the stand-alone setting is characterized by an investment of CV C 2 and R
The results show that the shareholding, that maximize the joint utility of a stable syndicate, can be established for all possible equilibria of the stand-alone setting.
Indeed, the expected cash flow has to be suitable such that both investors accept a joint investment.
Nash Bargaining Solution
Finally, I endogenize the shareholding decision of the syndicate partners. Following Casamatta and Haritchabalet (2007) , I use the Nash bargaining solution as negotiation concept for the shareholding allocation.
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The Nash bargaining solution is an approach for a two-person bargaining problem.
In the present model, the CVCs divide the shares of a syndicate to participate in the syndicate surplus. If negotiation succeeds, then the CVCs conclude a contract on the shareholding. Note that the shareholding allocation is restricted, such that the CVCs are better-off compared to the disagreement point. This disagreement point is the equilibrium of the stand-alone setting or in other words the utility the CVCs can expect to receive if the negotiation breaks down.
Suppose the disagreement point is characterized by no investment, then the Nash bargaining solution can be determined for CV C 1 through the following maximization 21 See, for instance Laengle and Loyola (2012) for a bargaining problem with externalities.
problem:
The parameter δ is CV C 1 's and (1 − δ) CV C 2 's share in the joint profit, respectively. Intuitively, both investors equally divide the joint profits due to the same disagreement point. However, the syndication contract only includes a shareholding on the expected cash flow. I have to determine the particular share α for CV C 1 :
I proceed with the case that the disagreement point is characterized by an investment of CV C 1 . Then the following utility differences exist:
2 , respectively. For clarity, I only state the solution for the shareholding on the expected cash flow:
Last, suppose the disagreement point is characterized by an investment of CV C 2 .
The same approach holds as for the previous step. Thus, I only show the particular shareholding:
Given this, I want to justify the share α max that maximizes the joint surplus of a syndicate by means of bargaining. Hence, I use the analysis for the feasible set of the shareholding (i.e. Proposition (8)) and the conditions under which the shareholding α max can be established for the feasible set (i.e. Proposition (10)). In this way, Proposition (11) entails conditions under which the shareholding α max can be implemented by the Nash bargaining solution for a stable syndicate: It seems worth noting that there exists a positive external effect for the rejecting investor in case of the last two points of Proposition (11), due to the costless change in the asset's value. Hence, the possibility to bargain for the shares may be viewed as an internalization of this externality. Henceforth, after bargaining, the formerly rejecting investor joins a syndicate and bears some of the investment costs.
However, Proposition (11) states that the Nash bargaining solution only achieve the shareholding α max in a few special cases and fails in general, respectively. Clearly, transfer payments between the CVCs may be a possibility to increase the number of solutions. 22 Nevertheless, I view syndicate agreements with transfers as less likely for venture capital investments, following Casamatta and Haritchabalet (2007) .
Numerical Examples
To study In Example (i), both investors obtain a stronger change in the assets values than in Example (ii). However, CV C 1 obtains a stronger increase in θ 1 than CV C 2 in θ 2 . Hence, the former investor obtains less shares in a syndicate that maximizes the joint surplus of a syndicate due to equation (24). On the other hand, in Example
(ii), CV C 1 obtains more shares than in Example (i) because the change in the assets values is almost similar. Thus, these examples illustrate the balancing effect of the shareholding, in the sense that the change in the asset's value becomes balanced by the syndicate shares.
Empirical Predictions
The findings of the present model allows us to derive some empirical predictions about the investment decision of CVCs that are confronted with innovation objectives:
• Syndicates may also established by CVCs with countervailing incentives because of the change in the asset's value. Therefore, if one CVC obtains a positive change, whereas the other obtains a negative change, then a stand-alone investments of the former CVC leads to a higher nonmonetary support. However, in some cases cost sharing eclipse this value added, so that a syndicate occurs.
Finally, the model shows that the division of the shares in a syndicate can balance the change in the asset's value among the CVCs. Hence, if this change occurs as a positive external effect, the allocation of the shareholding may internalizes this externality.
Appendix A. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2.
I consider a syndicate, in which each CV C i obtains
The optimal support value s syn i is given by:
For syndicate member CV C i this yields:
This support level dominates all other support levels, regardless of what CV C j does, and is hence a best response to the support s syn j . There is thus a unique equilibrium in nonmonetary support levels.
Proof of Lemma 1. To proof Lemma 1, I characterize different thresholds for the expected cash flow:
• Start with the case where υ * 2 (0) ≤ 0:
• I proceed with the case where υ * * 1 (0) ≤ θ 2 and υ * *
Equivalently, υ * * 1 (0) ≤ θ 1 and υ * 2 (θ 1 ) ≤ 0 if and only if R ≥ R.
• Last, I check the case where υ * * *
Last, I check the order of the different thresholds for the expected cash flow:
Hence, the following order exists: R < R < R.
Proof of Proposition 3.
(i) Suppose that conditions (6) and (8) do not hold, i.e. the equilibrium of the stand-alone setting is characterized by no investment. One checks easily that
In other words, if CV C 2 accepts a syndicate, then the same applies for CV C 1 . Also, 0 < υ * 2 (θ 1 ) < θ 2 since R < R. Therefore, a syndicate is stable -if R < R and condition (12) holds,
(ii) Suppose that condition (6) does not hold and (8) holds or that condition (6) and (10) hold, i.e. the equilibrium of the stand-alone setting is characterized by an investment of CV C 1 . Hence, I consider υ * * * 1 (θ 1 ) and υ * * 2 (θ 1 ). One checks easily that ϕ(θ 1 ) > υ * * * 1 (θ 1 ) ∀θ 1 ≥ 0. Therefore, a syndicate is stable -if R < R and condition (14) holds. I have not to consider (13) due to R < R.
-if R > R and condition (13) holds. I have not to consider (14) due to
(iii) Suppose that condition (6) holds and (10) does not hold, i.e. the equilibrium of the stand-alone setting is characterized by an investment of CV C 2 . One checks easily that ϕ(θ 1 ) > υ * * * 2 (θ 1 ) ∀θ 1 ≥ 0.
Note that I assume θ 1 ≥ θ 2 . Quite naturally, I have to check υ * *
This threshold differs only slightly from R. Moreover, I have the following order:
Hence, a syndicate is stable -if R < R and condition (15) holds,
Consider Figure 3 , it summarizes the results depending on the expected cash flow. Proof of Proposition 5. I relax the assumption that the venture is a complement for both investors and suppose that CV C 2 is confronted with a substitute (θ 2 < 0).
Furthermore, the venture is a complement for CV C 1 .
(i) First, suppose that condition (8) does not hold, i.e. the equilibrium of the stand-alone setting is characterized by no investment. I have only to consider υ * 2 (θ 1 ) [See, proof of Proposition 3]. The syndicate is stable if R ≥ R and condition (12) holds. Otherwise the syndicate is not stable.
(ii) Suppose that condition (8) holds, i.e. the equilibrium of the stand-alone setting is characterized by a stand-alone investment of CV C 1 . I consider υ * * * 1 (θ 1 ) and υ * * 2 (θ 1 ). Then a syndicate is stable -if R < R and conditions (13) and (14) hold, -if R ≤ R < R and condition (13) holds.
Proof of Proposition 6.
Intuitively, a syndicate lead to a higher value added than a stand-alone investor if the sum of the syndicate support is higher than the support of a possible stand-alone investor: Proof of Proposition 8. I characterize different thresholds for the expected cash flow:
• Start with the case where the equilibrium of the stand-alone setting is characterized by no investment: 
If condition (32), (20) and ( −2r + g(R − θ 1 + θ 2 )(2 + q8R + θ 1 + θ 2 ) 2(−2r + qR(2 + q(R + θ 1 + θ 2 ))) = 1 2
(ii) Suppose the disagreement point is characterized by an investment of CV C 1 .
Then the following utility difference exist: ∆U This yields: δ = −4 + 4q(R + θ 1 ) + q 2 (R 2 (2 + 2α − 2α 2 ) + E 2(−4 + 2r + 2q(R + θ 1 + θ 2 ) + q 2 (R 2 (1 + 2α − 2α 2 ) + F , where E = 2θ I have to determine the particular share α of the expected cash flow:
= δU joint ⇔ α = −4r + q(2qR 2 + 2R(2 + qθ 1 ) + qθ 2 (θ 2 − 2θ 1 )) 2(−2r + qR(2 + q(R + θ 1 + θ 2 ))) Next, I justify the share α max that maximizes the joint surplus of a syndicate by means of bargaining:
−4r + q(2qR 2 + 2R(2 + qθ 1 ) + qθ 2 (θ 2 − 2θ 1 )) 2(−2r + qR(2 + q(R + θ 1 + θ 2 ))) = 1 2 + θ 2 − θ 1 2R ⇔ θ 1 = r − qR + q 2 R(−R + θ 2 ) + r 2 − 2qrR + q 2 R 2 (1 + q 2 θ 2 2 ) q 2 R (iii) Suppose the disagreement point is characterized by an investment of CV C 2 .
The same approach holds as for part (ii). Thus, I only show the particular shareholding:
=δU joint ⇔ α = −q 2 θ 1 (−2R + θ 1 − 2θ 2 ) 2(−2r + qR(2 + q(R + θ 1 + θ 2 ))) Last, I justify the share α max that maximizes the joint surplus of a syndicate by means of bargaining:
−q 2 θ 1 (−2R + θ 1 − 2θ 2 ) 2(−2r + qR(2 + q(R + θ 1 + θ 2 ))) = 1 2 + θ 2 − θ 1 2R ⇔ θ 1 = R + θ 2 (−2r + qR(2 + q(R + θ 2 ))) 2(−r + qR(1 + q(R + θ 2 )))
